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THE IMPACT OF WEBER

Editor's note -In

Commentary, which
appears elsewhere in this edition, columnist Carl Rowan makes note of
Bakke and Weber, two recent Supreme
Court decisions. We have previously
dealt with the Bakke case in our October 1977 and October 1978 editions.
The following article by Geoffrey Simmons, a 1974 Phi Beta Kappa at Howard University, and a 1977 graduate of

the Duke University School of Law, is
an assessment of the Weber decision
on affirmative action programs. Simmons is presently a Namaskar Fellow
and is engaged in research dealing
with new developments in employment
opportunities for minorities. Formerly,
he was staff aide in the Office of the
Governor of North Carolina.

By Geoffrey H. Simmons

discrimination."
What can we do?"
These kind of statements were common
among corporate executives across the
country.
In a survey commissioned
by Barnhill-Hayes, Inc, (a management consulting firm specializing in affirmative action)
during January of 1979, it was discovered that management's
greatest affirmative action concerns were, first, being
fined for past discrimination; second, losing government contracts; and third, adverse publicity.
These factors underscore the importance
of management
seeking assurances
when establishing
programs, such as the one adopted at
the Kaiser plant.
To understand the possible impact of
Weber on the business community, one
must examine the history of the case and
the impressions of the attorneys who litigated the case before the Supreme
Court. It is they who can best give the
public guidance
as to the method by
which this case ought to be utilized.

lective bargaining that year." The lawyers
thought that it might be "prudent to get an
umbrella
over this revolutionary
program." They later met with government
officials and discussed the possibility of
a consent decree. The aluminum and
container industries had similar agreements in their contracts, according
to
Gottesman.

By now most Americans have read or
heard about the Supreme Court's June
27, 1979 decision in the case of United
Steelworkers
of America
v. Brian F
Weber. Some people have disagreed
with the court's holding while others have
praised the court's 5-2 ruling. Most discussions have centered on the meaning
of Section 703(d) of Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act and whether a literal
reading of that section, which was designed to outlaw any form of racial discrimination by an employer, would prohibit Kaiser Aluminum from establishing
a race-conscious
job training program to
increase the number of Black skilled
craft workers in its plant in Gramercy, La.
The majority of the justices said, in
effect, that the spirit of the statute would
permit the continuation
of the type of
program that was in operation
in the
Gramercy plant.
Business executives had watched the
progression of Weber through the courts
with much concern. They were anxious
to ascertain the impact of the case on
affirmative action. Before Weber, managers believed that they could not engage
in race-conscious
affirmative action programs to increase minority representation without the court first determining
that there had been a history of past
discrimination
at their particular industry
or business. And most personnel and
legal counsel offices were convinced
that their businesses would be making
themselves liable for lawsuits if they admitted to participating
in unlawful and
discriminatory
practices in the past.
Therefore, companies were hesitant to
establish voluntary programs to increase
opportunities for minorities that took race
or sex into account. The dilemma was
now apparent: "If we continue to have a
racially imbalanced
work-force
we will
be subject to lawsuits by minorities seeking employment and promotions; on the
other hand, if we hire minorities
to
ameliorate the imbalance and promote
minorities over whites without regard to
seniority we will be accused of reverse
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One of the lawyers is Michael H. Gottesman, of the law firm of Bredhoff, Gottesman, Cohen and Weinberg, in Washington,
D. C., who represented
the
Steelworkers Union.
While addressing
members
of the
Labor and Employment Law Section of
the American Bar Association in Dallas,
Texas, last August,
Gottesman
discussed his impressions of Weber and the
future of affirmative action in America.
"In 1973 the Steelworkers Union's Executive Board adopted a resolution that
called for some radical changes in the
collective bargaining
rounds that were
coming up the following year in the steel,
aluminum and container industries," he
said. Further, Gottesman noted the talks
included the conversion of the seniority
system, among other things. One of the
important items mentioned, was a "provision that the union would seek quotas
for the filling
of craft training
jobs
throughout the industry. The Union put
this program to the bargaining table in all
three industries;
negotiated
for it and
succeeded in getting quotas in the col-

The program was a popular one and
was greeted at several plants with virtually no opposition. Brian Weber was the
only person, according to Gottesman, to
bring suit contesting the program. The
union met with lower level employees
and the plan was approved
and accepted. It was ironic that the Gramercy
plant's new program was attacked by
Weber, since it was at this very plant that
the program was of substantial benefit to
Blacks as well as whites. Except at
Gramercy, several of the other plants
involved in the affirmative action program had previously established some
type of apprenticeship
programs.
Gottesman pointed out that the aluminum and container industries were dominated by white males, while "minority
populations
in the steel industry
exceeded the number of minorities in the
labor-force,
generally." However, there
were very few Blacks or other minorities
in the skilled
craft unions.
At the
Gramercy plant, Black employees were
less than two percent of its total number
of craft workers, even though 43 percent
of the surrounding Louisiana population
was Black. An argument that there had
been past discrimination
in selecting
persons for the skilled craft training programs at this plant was uninviting since
there had never been a skilled craft trai ning program.
The lower courts ruled in favor of
Weber because there had been no past
discrimination
involved in the training
program. Gottesman said, "it was the
general wisdom of the lower courts,
heretofore, that a race-conscious
program designed to eliminate racial discrimination is not in violation of Title VII
unless there is a finding of past discrimi-
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nation or if there is a reasonable basis to
believe that there has been discrimination."
The union argued before the Supreme
Court that "prior to 1964 an industry
could have any kind of race-conscious
program that it wanted and certainly the
1964 Civil Rights Act was not designed to
prohibit an industry from voluntarily establishing such a program to the benefit
of Blacks." The union further argued that
"legislative history indicates that the
Congress did intend on this happening."
To support this position, Gottesman
compiled 70 pages of quotes from the
legislative history. This point is very important in light of the fact that many articles about the Weber case make much
ado about the dissent by Justice William
Rehnquist and the fact it is saturated with
legislative history while little legislative
history is noted in the majority's decision.
What the Court Said in Weber
The Supreme Court did not outline the full
range of permissible affirmative action
programs. The court held that, wherever
the line is, this case (Weber) falls within
that line. There are four aspects about
the program approved in Weber that
may give guidance to the private sector:
• There were no white employees
displaced by the program.
• The program was designed to be
temporary. It was agreed that once the
number of Blacks in the skilledtcraft
jobs approximated the number of
Blacks in the labor-force of the locality,
the program would then be eliminated.
• The formula used to choose persons for the program was based on a
50/50 scheme. One Black would be
chosen for every white chosen.
• The program was designed to eliminate a racial imbalance in an area of
employment traditionally denied to
women and racial minorities.

Another lawyer, Thompson Powers, of
the Washington law firm of Steptoe &
Johnson, who was counsel for Kaiser,
said, during the American Bar Association meeting in Dallas, that there are
many possibilities after Weber. More
middle management white-collar jobs
could be filled by minorities using the
arguments presented in the Weber case
and paralleling those arguments to corporate business situations. Blacks and
women who are seldom seen on Wall
Street in brokerage firms or in large law
firms may find themselves beneficiaries
of the Weber decision, Powers noted.
There are many areas where minorities
have been traditionally excluded that
may now become accessible. Business
executives in the South may find that by
establishing training programs in industries, such as electronic parts-producing
plants, they can increase Black employment in the areas where their firms
are beginning to locate. Many of these
areas have large Black labor-forces.
Powers noted that a company can find
a way to increase affirmative action if
there is a commitment to do so.
Weber makes it easier for a company
to make such a commitment,
says
Charles Lawrence, III, co-author of a
recent book, The Bakke Case, and visiting professor at the Harvard Law School.
Lawrence says that Weber gives industry the green light to move forward on
affirmative action. But he warns: there
must still be incentives available for industry or it will not establish voluntary
programs. Likewise, he states, "pressure
must be put on industry to respond positively to Weber Civil rights organizations
should talk with industry leaders and get
them to do now that which can legally be
done. Weber frees industry to demonstrate its commitment to affirmative action without the threat of lawsuits claiming reverse discrimination."

cou rt refused to state definitively whether
a goal can be set on hiring minorities that
exceeds the number in the labor-force.
The court did not define the limits for a
"temporary" program. Government officials were not covered by Weber
Eleanor Holmes Norton of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission
said recently that the Supreme Court left
"great room for business to proceed ..
without looking over its shoulders for
possible 'reverse discrimination' liability." She also said that her agency's new
systematic program would not be directed at companies that use the Weber
initiative to correct class-wide discrimination on their own, but would concentrate on companies that remained
recalcitrant.
0

When examining the program at the
Unanswered Questions
Kaiser plant in Gramercy, one can see
The Supreme Court did not decide
many possibilities for industry to be creative and ambitious in its quest to beef up -whether an industry can fill 100% of its
existing vacancies with minorities. The
affirmative
action
.
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